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Abstract: The cost of recovery after a cybersecurity attack is likely to be high and may result in the
loss of business at the extremes. Evaluating the acquired cybersecurity capabilities and evolving them
to a desired state in consideration of risks are inevitable. This research proposes the CYberSecurity
Focus Area Maturity (CYSFAM) Model for assessing cybersecurity capabilities. In this design science
research, CYSFAM was evaluated at a large financial institution. From the many cybersecurity
standards, 11 encompassing focus areas were identified. An assessment instrument—containing
144 questions—was developed. The in-depth single case study demonstrates how and to what extent
cybersecurity related deficiencies can be identified. The novel scoring metric has been proven to
be adequate, but can be further improved upon. The evaluation results show that the assessment
questions suit the case study target audience; the assessment can be performed within four hours; the
organization recognizes itself in the result.
Keywords: cybersecurity; cybersecurity risk assessment; cybersecurity capability improvement;
cyber-risks; cyber-attacks; design science research; standards
1. Introduction
The Global Risks Report 2020 revealed that cyberattacks rank seventh place in terms of likelihood
and eighth place in terms of impact among the top 10 risks. In 2021, cybercrime damages are estimated
to reach 6 trillion USD [1].
Almost daily, incidents prove that cybersecurity-related risks are high and both individual hackers
and professionally organized cybercrime groups are responsible for these incidents [2,3]. Understanding
the cybersecurity risks and possible countermeasures is of paramount importance due to both the
likelihood and the impact of these risks. In the era of cyber-physical systems (CPS) and the Internet
of Things (IoT), cybersecurity is beyond the scope of a particular organization. The consequences of
cyber-attacks are often borderless and expand to societies. Recent research in cybersecurity put forward
a diversity of areas to investigate, such as: transportation [4,5], IoT, CPS [6,7], and healthcare [8,9].
Nevertheless, due to the ever-changing nature of cyber-risks, and with the continual inclusion of new
assets, organizations need a holistic and persistent approach to cybersecurity. The present research
focuses on cybersecurity from an organizational perspective to help generic organizations tackle
cybersecurity challenges.
Standards have been a trustworthy resource for those (individuals, organisations, governments,
etc.) who seek the answer to the question “what is the best way of doing this?” [10]. As in every domain,
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standards on cybersecurity and information security build on experience and best practices that may
help organisations to cope with cyber threats.
As a result of the attention given to cybersecurity, there has been an abundance of scientific
research with increasing intensity in this decade. However, little research has been performed in
developing a standard-based process improvement framework. The small number of frameworks
available are mostly based on the Capability Maturity Model (CMM) [11,12], but they received some
critical remarks; mainly related to implementation costs, applicability, and reliability [13].
Previous scientific work has shown that focus area maturity models (FAMs) have several
advantages as improvement frameworks [14]. Furthermore, focus area maturity modelling has been
shown to be suitable for developing a valid maturity model ISFAM (Information Security Focus Area
Maturity) model [15]. ISFAM focuses on information security capabilities. In this paper, the authors
provide a holistic view of all security domains—information security, cybersecurity, network security,
application security, etc.—and their relationships. The aim is to propose a comprehensive cybersecurity
capability coverage to accompany information security capabilities.
The present research aims to answer the following research question: “How can cybersecurity
capabilities for generic organisations be modelled in a focus area maturity model?” This paper presents
the CyberSecurity Focus Area Maturity (CYSFAM) model that was developed using the method
presented by [14]. Amongst several existing cybersecurity maturity models, CYSFAM has distinctive
characteristics; it is mainly based on international standards and frameworks, it is intended for
generic organisations and it is structured as a focus area maturity model—the only cybersecurity
focus area maturity model. The present paper contributes to the cybersecurity maturity modeling
body of knowledge as a mainly standard-based focus area maturity model for generic organizations.
Using CYSFAM, practitioners can assess and improve their cybersecurity capabilities with the help of
144 assessment questions/capabilities categorized into 11 focus areas. The paper presents an overarching
approach to cybersecurity that can enable organizations to see the broad view on cybersecurity domain.
The analysis and the visual presentation of the dependencies between the capabilities facilitate capability
improvement planning.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: first, the related work on security domains, existing
information security and cybersecurity maturity models, the concept and design of FAMs, and the
ISFAM are introduced. Second, the design science research framework and methodology applied for
artifact development are described. Third, CYSFAM is presented. Fourth, the evaluation of the model
and its results are presented. Fifth, the findings are discussed. Lastly, conclusions are drawn and the
areas for future research are given.
2. Related Work
In this section, firstly, cybersecurity and its relationship with other security domains are discussed.
Secondly, the information and cybersecurity maturity models found in the literature are presented.
Thirdly, standard categories, information security and cybersecurity standards for generic organisations
are discussed. Fourthly, the perspective and design of FAMs are presented. Lastly, ISFAM is presented.
2.1. Cybersecurity and Other Security Domains
There are gaps and overlaps in the definition of cybersecurity in standardisation [16]. In the
analysis of several standards and the definitions provided by the cybersecurity-related technical
committees of standards developing organizations (SDOs), the following definition can be derived:
cybersecurity is protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of assets in cyberspace
from cyber-attacks. Cyberspace is an environment of interconnected computers, devices, electronic
communications systems and services, wire communication, and electronic communication, including
the information contained therein [16]. International Organization for Standardization /International
Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC) recognizes a distinct relationship between cybersecurity
and other security-related domains [17]. This relationship can be modelled as shown in Figure 1,
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which depicts both the relationships of the security domains and the standards ISO/IEC has published
specifically for these domains.
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little to no attention to external parties.
In order to help to improve general awareness on standardization, certification, and labelling in
cybersecurity, the European Cybersecurity Organisation (ECSO) published an overview of existing
cybersecurity standards and certification schemes [19]. Given the extensive number of domain-related
standards, this document helps organisations and individuals to address the relevant standards easily.
In this state of the art syllabus document, ECSO not only focuses on the standards specific to sectors,
but also the standards applicable to generic organisations. The generic organisations in this sense
are those not associated with any particular industry vertical (e.g., energy, healthcare, and telecom).
It should be noted that the standards applicable to generic organisations are also perfectly applicable
to industry verticals but may not include the sector-specific requirements.
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Table 1 lists the ISO standards for generic organisations provided in the overview of cybersecurity
standards [19]. The first column presents the related security domain or topic. Compared to Figure 1,
this list includes additional standards: privacy, incident management, and supplier relationships security.
Table 1. Cybersecurity standards for generic organisations published by ISO [19].






Cybersecurity ISO/IEC 27032:2012—Information technology—Securitytechniques—Guidelines for cybersecurity [17]
Network security ISO/IEC 27033-1:2015—Information technology—Securitytechniques—Network security—Part 1: Overview and concepts [21]
Application security ISO/IEC 27034-1:2011—Information technology—Securitytechniques—Application security—Part 1: Overview and concepts [22]
Incident management
ISO/IEC 27035-1:2016—Information technology—Security
techniques—Information security incident management—Part 1:





techniques—Information security for supplier relationships—Part 1:
Overview and concepts
[24]
Privacy ISO/IEC 29100:2011—Information technology—Securitytechniques—Privacy framework [25]
2.3. Information Security and Cybersecurity Maturity Models
Previous studies have investigated information security and cybersecurity maturity models [26–28].
These maturity models have different focuses according to their purpose and target. Some examples of
purpose and target for the existing maturity models are critical infrastructures, generic organisations,
and cybersecurity workforce planning [29]. Among the information security and cybersecurity
maturity models in the literature, ISFAM [15] is the only focus area maturity model, and it is based
on widely-implemented industry standards. This model is elaborated upon in Section 2.5. There is
no previously developed focus area cybersecurity maturity model in literature. We believe the
capability interdependency presentations in focus area maturity models have the benefit of providing
organisations with guidance for capability implementation planning.
In Table 2, we present the comparison of several information security and cybersecurity maturity
models. The list of the maturity models presented in Table 2 is as follows:
• CYSFAM: The Cybersecurity Focus Area Maturity Model introduced in the present paper.
• C2M2: Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model [30].
• SSE-CMM: System Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model [31].
• NICE: National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) Cybersecurity Workforce Framework [32].
• O-ISM3: The Open Group Information Security Management Maturity Model [33].
• ISFAM: The Information Security Focus Area Maturity Model [15].
The features in Table 2 are briefly explained as follows:
Cybersecurity-focused: This feature shows whether the maturity model is designed to cover the
cybersecurity domain. It is obvious for the information security maturity models that they are not
focused on cybersecurity but information security.
FAM or CMM: This feature shows whether the maturity model is of focus area maturity model
type (FAM) or capability maturity model type (CMM).
Target sector: This feature shows whether the maturity model’s target audience is a specific sector
or any generic organization.
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Table 2. Comparison of the features of information security and cybersecurity maturity models.
Features CYSFAM C2M2 [30] SSE-CMM [31] NICE [32] O-ISM3 [33] ISFAM [15]
Cybersecurity-focused Yes Yes No Yes No No
FAM or CMM FAM CMM CMM CMM CMM FAM
Target sector Generic Critical infrastructures Security engineering Workforce Generic Generic
Incorporates standards Mainly Partly No No Partly Mainly
Analysis of interdependencies
between the processes/capabilities Yes No No No No Yes
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Incorporates standards: This feature shows whether the maturity model incorporates processes
or capabilities derived from standards. Mainly means that most of the capabilities or the processes
are derived from standards. Partly means some of the capabilities or the processes are derived from
standards. As the development phases of all of the maturity models in Table 2 are not clearly known to
us, our decisions for this feature were based on available information on the maturity model.
Analysis of interdependencies between the processes/capabilities: This feature shows whether
the maturity model provides an analysis of interdependencies between the processes and capabilities.
The FAMs entail this feature by design, whereas CMMs only state that lower-level processes are to be
implemented before higher-level processes.
The characteristics of CYSFAM in comparison to existing alternatives can be seen in Table 2.
CYSFAM has the following advantages: focusing on cybersecurity of generic organisations,
being mainly based on standards, and showing the interdependencies between capabilities to facilitate
implementation planning.
2.4. Focus Area Maturity Models (FAMs)
FAMs were first proposed by Koomen and Pol [34]. Steenbergen et.al. notably formalized and
provided a process deliverable diagram to develop this type of maturity model. In the present paper,
we followed the process presented by Steenbergen et.al. [14]. We elaborately present the development
steps of CYSFAM (the artifact) in Section 4. An FAM aims to provide complete coverage of the
domain for which it is designed by presenting the capabilities the domain entails and positioning the
capabilities in a matrix relative to each other according to their dependencies [29].
FAMs consist of several focus areas. Each focus area comprises unique capabilities (2–6) that are
indicated with a capital letter [35]. The building block of an FAM, a capability, is defined as “an ability
to achieve a predefined goal that is associated with a certain maturity level” [14].
2.5. ISFAM: The Information Security Focus Area Maturity Model
ISFAM [15] is the only existing FAM on information security within the literature. ISFAM’s broad
coverage comes from its 13 focus areas, 51 information security capabilities, and 161 statements that are
derived from well-known industry standards. ISFAM was proposed to help organisations, especially
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), achieve strategy-information technology (IT) security
alignment in ever-changing security risk environments [15].
3. Materials and Methods
The design science research (DSR) paradigm has been promoted as an information systems (IS)
research paradigm and recognised to improve the relevance and rigor of IS research [36]. Design science
research aims at the development of artifacts in the form of different types of constructs (i.e., concepts,
methods, models). In the present research, the artifact of the research is CYSFAM. Various methodologies
have been proposed to support DSR [37,38]. In the present research, we follow the steps proposed
by Peffers et al. [37]. Following this DSR methodology, our research includes realising a problem
situation, reviewing the literature, identifying the cybersecurity focus areas and capabilities, identifying
the dependencies and positioning the capabilities in the maturity matrix, developing the scoring
mechanism for capability assessment, evaluating CYSFAM with domain experts, demonstrating
CYSFAM in a case study company, and communicating the research objectives, structure and results to
the other researchers.
To provide a better understanding of our research context, our research framework based on
Hevner et al. is depicted in Figure 2 [36].
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4. Artifact Development
This section presents the development steps of CYSFAM (including the literature search, the process
of identifying the focus areas and the capabilities).
4.1. Identifying the Initial Set of Focus Areas, Relevant Standards and Frameworks
To identify the focus areas, the authors used international standards that characterize the
cybersecurity domain. Due to their high level of usage and acceptance, the standards published by ISO
were used to compose the initial list of cybersecurity focus areas. As described in Section 2, the authors
relied on the standards (see Figure 1) presented in the main cybersecurity standard from ISO: ISO/IEC
27032-Cybersecurity guidelines. In addition, the authors included the ISO/IEC 27035- Information
security incident management standard as it is related to all security domains. Incident management is
also covered as the “Framework of information sharing and coordination” in ISO/IEC 27032. The final
list that the investigation of the focus areas involved is given in Table 3.
Table 3. Baseline of cybersecurity standards to identify the initial set of focus areas.
Standard Reference
ISO/IEC 27032:2012—Information technology—Security
techniques—Guidelines for cybersec rity [17]
ISO/IEC 27033-1:2015—Information technology—Security
techniques—Network security—Part 1: Overview and concepts [21]
ISO/IEC 27034-1:2011—Information technology—Security
techniques—Application security—Part 1: Overview and concepts [22]
ISO/IEC 27035-1:2016—Information technology—Security
techniques—Information security incident manageme t—Part 1:
Principles of incident management
[23]
The relationship model of cybersecurity with other security domains (Figure 1) shows that
cybersecurity has intersections with application security and network security. To discover these
intersections, the authors included the corresponding ISO standards in their investigation. The information
security standard (ISO/IEC 27001, [20]) was excluded since this domain was already covered in ISFAM
(see Section 2). Internet security is regarded as an extension of network security and no specific standard
J. Cybersecur. Priv. 2021, 1 126
was mentioned for this domain [17]. The authors also performed a search on ISO’s website by using
the keyword “internet security”, resulting in no dedicated standard. As the research question addresses
generic organisations, the standards for critical infrastructure security were not included.
The initial set of focus areas identified in this first iteration are listed in Table 4.
Table 4. The initial set of focus areas of CYSFAM.
Focus Area Reference
Server protection (elaborated upon in ISO/IEC 27032) [17]
End-user controls (elaborated upon in ISO/IEC 27032) [17]
Controls against Social Engineering (elaborated upon in ISO/IEC 27032) [17]
Network security (the main focus of ISO/IEC 27033) [21]
Application security (the main focus of ISO/IEC 27034) [22]
Cyber/Information Security Incident Management (the main focus of ISO/IEC 27035) [23]
In the second iteration, the references in the standards (Table 3) were analysed. Additional
standards and frameworks identified in this iteration are given in Table 5.
Table 5. Standards and frameworks identified after analysing the reference sections. ITU, International
Telecommunication Union; ISA, International Society of Automation; NIST, National Institute of
Standards and Technology; NERC, North American Electric Reliability Corporation.
Standard or Framework References
ITU-T ICT Security Standards Roadmap [39]
Guidebook on National Cyber Security Strategies [40]
ISA/IEC-62443 [41]
NIST 800-12 and NIST 800-14 [42,43]
NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Standards [44]
NERC Security Guidelines [45]
Finally, a multi-vocal (scientific and grey) literature search was performed to gather relevant
articles with the details depicted in Table 6.
Table 6. The search platforms and the keywords used in the literature search.
Search Platforms Most Prominent Keywords
Google Scholar [information/cyber] security frameworks
Google [information/cyber] security risks
Mendeley [information/cyber] security controls
CIO.com [information/cyber] security vulnerabilities
Gartner
[information/cyber] security maturity model
[information/cyber] security capability
A number of inclusion criteria were defined in this focused literature search:
• Articles have to be written in the English language.
• Articles have to originate from a trustworthy source (e.g., a professional, specialized organization).
• Articles have to be published in the year 2010 or later.
• Articles have to be accessible without cost (note that institutional subscriptions were used).
Table 7 presents the results of this literature search.
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Table 7. The standards and frameworks that were identified after the literature search. NIST, National
Institute of Standards and Technology; IASME, Information Assurance for Small and Medium-Sized
Enterprises; ISF, Information Security Forum.
Standard or Framework Reference
Critical Security Controls for Effective Cyber Defense [46]
Cyber Security Self-Assessment Guidance [47]
NIST 800-53 [48]
Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) [30]
The IASME Governance Standard for Information and Cyber Security [49]
A Maturity Model for Enterprise Key Management [50]
ISF Standard of Good Practice for Information Security [51]
Guidelines for Managing the Security of Mobile Devices in the Enterprise [52]
Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Technologies [53]
4.2. Defining the Cybersecurity Focus Areas and Capabilities
The following steps were followed to identify the cybersecurity focus areas and capabilities.
1. The findings from the ISO/IEC 2703x were translated to an initial number of focus areas (Table 4).
2. The additional 15 standards and frameworks (Tables 5 and 7) were analysed and translated to a
number of focus areas. These standards and frameworks were to identify the focus-areas that the
ISO/IEC standards did not explicitly have in scope. This led to a long list of focus areas (77 in
total) that could serve as an augmentation of CYSFAM.
3. This long list of candidates CYSFAM focus areas was analysed to define the final set of CYSFAM
focus areas. Within this set of focus areas, the decision to either adopt or exclude a focus area was
based on the following criteria.
◦ The focus area is meaningful to CYSFAM; it concerns a cybersecurity-related area.
◦ The focus area is not yet adequately represented in existing focus areas in the ISFAM
(see Section 2) or CYSFAM.
◦ The focus area is not specific to a particular domain or organization-type; it serves a broad
range of organizations.
After the deduction process, the complete list of CYSFAM focus areas (11 in total) was established
as shown in Table 8.
4. The next step was to determine the capabilities under each focus area by analysing the resources
that led the authors to the focus areas. The number of capability statements identified for each
focus area and related standards, models, and frameworks are given in Table 8. The total number
of capability statements was 144.
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Table 8. Focus areas of CYSFAM and reference standards, models, and frameworks.
# Focus Area Number of CapabilityAssessment Questions Standard/Model/Framework
1 Server protection 16
ISO/IEC 27032 [17], The ISF
Standard of Good Practice for
Information Security [51,53]
2 End-user controls 15 ISO/IEC 27032 [17]
3 Controls against Social Engineering 7 ISO/IEC 27032 [17]
4 Network security 12 ISO/IEC 27033 [21]
5 Application security 8 ISO/IEC 27034 [22]
6 Cybersecurity Incident Management 16 ISO/IEC 27035 [23]
7 Cybersecurity awareness 16 Security Awareness Roadmap [54],ISO/IEC 27001 [20]
8 Cryptography 16 A Maturity Model for EnterpriseKey Management [50]
9 Cybersecurity governance 14 Cyber Security Self-AssessmentGuidance [47]
10 Mobile security 16
Guidelines for Managing the
Security of Mobile Devices in the
Enterprise [52]
11 Vulnerability management 8 Critical Security Controls forEffective Cyber Defense [46]
4.3. Identifying the Dependencies and Positioning the Capabilities in the Maturity Matrix
Another step in developing CYSFAM was to identify the dependencies of the capabilities and
positioning them in a maturity matrix. Some capabilities in CYSFAM required that one or more other
capabilities, either in the same focus area or in another focus area, be implemented first.
In this section, first, dependencies between the capabilities are explained. Second, a matrix that
presents the dependencies visually is presented.
The paragraphs below describe the dependencies of the capabilities and the arguments of
these dependencies.
Establishing cybersecurity capabilities in an organisation starts with management commitment.
The management should allocate resources for further implementations of cybersecurity capabilities [20].
The first capability to be implemented is, therefore, capability A of Cybersecurity Governance.
Capability B of Cybersecurity Governance follows next. With this capability, the roles and
responsibilities within the organisation are defined. This capability enables all the other organisational
capabilities to be implemented. Regarding the technical capabilities, network security should be
implemented before every other technical control in cyberspace can be implemented. Therefore,
Network Security capability A enables the other technical capabilities.
Cybersecurity Governance C requires serious security breaches to be escalated is, therefore, it is
dependent on Incident Management B. Incident Management B requires incident response teams to
receive vulnerability information from reliable sources. This constitutes a dependency on Vulnerability
Management B. Mobile Security A requires an employee awareness program, therefore, it is dependent
on Cybersecurity Awareness A.
Social Engineering Controls C requires a training and awareness program; therefore, it is dependent
on Cybersecurity Awareness capability B. End-user Control B requires the measurement of patch
delays; therefore, it is dependent on Server Protection A.
Cryptography A requires secure application development practices and, therefore, it is dependent
on Application Security A. Application Security B requires awareness training for the development
staff; therefore, it is dependent on Cybersecurity Awareness A.
Incident Management C requires specialised training for the CIRT (Critical Incident Response
Team) members; therefore, it is dependent on Cybersecurity Awareness B. Social Engineering Controls
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D requires social engineering risks to be incorporated in the organisation’s risk assessments; therefore,
it is dependent on Cybersecurity Governance capability D.
Server Protection D requires that the technical compliance checking solution is connected to the
organizations’ incident management system; therefore, it is dependent on Incident Management B.
The dependencies are presented in Table 9. The “From Capability” column shows the prerequisite
capability and the “To Capability” column shows the dependent capability.
Table 9. Dependencies of the capabilities in CYSFAM.
# Prerequisite Capability Dependent Capability
1 Cybersecurity Governance A Cybersecurity Governance B
2 Cybersecurity Governance B Network Security A
3 Cybersecurity Governance B Social Engineering Controls A
4 Cybersecurity Governance B Incident Management A
5 Cybersecurity Governance B Cybersecurity Awareness A
6 Network Security A Server Protection A
7 Network Security A End-user Controls A
8 Network Security A Application Security A
9 Network Security A Cryptography A
10 Network Security A Mobile Security A
11 Network Security A Vulnerability Management A
12 Incident Management B Cybersecurity Governance C
13 Vulnerability Management B Incident Management B
14 Server Protection A Vulnerability Management B
15 Cybersecurity Awareness A Mobile Security A
16 Cybersecurity Awareness B Social Engineering Controls C
17 Server Protection A End-user Controls B
18 Application Security A Cryptography A
19 Cybersecurity Awareness A Application Security B
20 Cybersecurity Awareness B Incident Management C
21 Cybersecurity Governance D Social Engineering Controls D
22 Incident Management B Server Protection D
In the next step, the dependencies were positioned in a maturity matrix. Following the rules
proposed by [14], capabilities that are dependent on other capabilities were always positioned further
to the right. The resulting matrix is presented in Figure 3. Blue arrows in Figure 3 visually show
the dependencies.
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processes, risk management, and human factors. A large body of literature has investigated the role
of human factors and awareness on information security or cybersecurity [55–57]. The “Technical”
category comprises focus areas that require technical capabilities to become mature.
4.4. Focus Area Scoring
There have been some signals that the scoring mechanism that is currently used in ISFAM [15]
has a deficiency. This deficiency relates to the rigid manner the achievement of the maturity level per
capability is calculated. According to [15], every question within a capability has to be answered with
“yes” before the entire capability is marked as achieved. For instance, when three out of four metrics in
capability A have been answered with “yes”, capability B can never be achieved.
To resolve this inequity, which could even lead to reduced accuracy in scoring the focus
area maturity levels, CYSFAM makes use of an alternative, experimental scoring mechanism.
Since alternative scoring mechanisms for FAMs are lacking in the literature (except perhaps for [58]),
we propose one on the basis of our expert opinion and on a best-effort basis. The scoring mechanism
of the CYSFAM works as follows:
• Every achieved step A capability represents a worth of 0.25.
• Every achieved step B capability represents a worth of 0.5.
• Every achieved step C capability represents a worth of 0.75.
• Every achieved step D capability represents a worth of 1.
• Every achieved step E capability represents a worth of 1.25.
The mechanism follows a number of preconditions:
• If the assessment of any focus area results in a total score that has decimals behind the point,
the score is rounded to its nearest natural number.
• A value of 0.25 is subtracted per unachieved capability at a previous level, when at least one of
the capabilities from a higher level is met.
5. Results
This section presents CYSFAM with a focus area example.
Focus Area Example: Server Protection
This subsection describes the process for determining the capabilities of the “Server Protection”
focus area.
According to ISO/IEC 27032 [17], server protection entails the protection of servers against
unauthorized access and hosting of malicious content. Capabilities found for the “Server Protection”
focus area are listed in Table 10. As shown in Table 8, the “Server Protection” focus area has 16 capability
statements within these capabilities.
Table 10. Initial set of capabilities for server protection focus area.
Capability Reference
Configuration according to a baseline security configuration ISO/IEC 27032 [17]
Testing and deployment of updates for the server operating system and the applications [53]
Implementing security incident event monitoring (SIEM) [51]
Implementing technical state compliance monitoring (TSCM) [51]
These capabilities were represented in levels of maturity (A–D), as shown in Table 11. In the
CYSFAM—conforming to the design principles of FAMs [14]—the capabilities are depicted by letters,
where a letter that is higher in the alphabetical order implies a higher level in the evolutionary maturity path.
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Table 11. The final set of capabilities for server protection focus area.
Capability Statements Capability
1. The organization’s baseline security configuration is described.
2. Patch management is tool-supported (patch-management suites).
3. A SIEM solution is in place.
4. A technical compliance checking solution is in place.
A
1. The baseline security configuration is based on an open standard.
2. The deployment of patches is tested and approved at least once before deployment in the
production environment.
3. The SIEM implementation is based on a baseline set of events.
4. Technical compliance checking is performed manually (supported by appropriate tools).
B
1. The baseline security configuration is reviewed at least once a year.
2. A process is in place that assures the organizations learns about patch releases as soon
as possible.
3. The SIEM implementation includes events that were identified during a risk assessment.
4. Technical compliance checking is performed with the assistance of automated tools (with
a reporting functionality).
C
1. The baseline security configuration is updated after every significant configuration
change or demonstrated vulnerability.
2. The prioritization of patches is risk-based; the business cruciality is taken into account.
3. The SIEM solution is connected to a security operations center (SOC) for a correlation of
events and is connected to the organization’s incident management system.
4. The technical compliance checking solution is connected to the organizations’ incident
management system.
D
The other 10 focus area (Table 8) capabilities were developed following the same approach.
The final CYSFAM focus areas and capabilities are depicted in Figure 4. The coloured cells show
the highest possible capabilities identified in the model.
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All of the focus areas and 144 capability statements/assessment questions for the capabilities
included in the model were published in a technical report which is openly accessible [59].
6. Evaluation
In this section, the evaluation of CYSFAM by means of both expert evaluations and a case study
is described. In this research, two interviews were conducted with the aim of expert evaluation.
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The evaluations of the experts were incorporated in CYSFAM, and this improved version was used in
the case study.
6.1. Expert Evaluation and Results
In a mixed-methods qualitative research engagement, expert interviews are a very suitable and
fruitful way to establish construct validity as discussed by [60]. Therefore, it was decided to evaluate
CYSFAM by means of expert evaluations. The selection criteria for the experts were as follows:
• The interviewee is experienced in the information or cybersecurity domain—a minimum of 5 years
of experience is required.
• The interviewee is capable of thinking outside of the context of the case study company.
• The interviewee can prove their knowledge by providing Certified Information Systems Security
Professional (CISSP) certification [61].
Two suitable domain experts were approached to participate in the evaluation.
The first interviewee was an IT security expert who had 15 years of experience and was working
at the case study company at the time of the interview was conducted. The second interviewee was an
external IT security consultant who was specialized in security in large organizations. Both interviewees
had CISSP certification. CYSFAM and the methods applied to develop the CYSFAM were introduced
to the interviewees. The interviewees evaluated CYSFAM in separate sessions without the researchers’
intervention. Finally, they provided the researchers with their evaluation results.
Interviews with the experts resulted in the following most important remarks:
1. CYSFAM entirely lacks a module on security in Cloud Computing, which is one of the most
prevalent security concerns for now and in the upcoming years. That certainly needs to be
included in the final model.
2. The scoring method is hard to grasp and, in its rigidness, it is somewhat harsh. However,
compliance agencies and auditors are usually also harsh; thus, that warrants such a setup.
3. CYSFAM is very control-based. It would be an idea to introduce two dimensions per focus area:
control-based and process-based (or process maturity).
4. CYSFAM contains quite some jargon. That is not necessarily an issue, but you need to be clear
about the intended target audience of CYSFAM (security experts, rather than management—upper
level or not).
5. There are a number of capabilities that could be better rephrased in CYSFAM.
The authors addressed these remarks as follows: for remark #1, cloud computing was investigated
in depth with regard to the security-related capabilities and controls that are in place. The results of
this investigation showed that, considering the range of this topic, a cloud security maturity model
could very well be an extensive maturity model on its own. Recently, a study on cloud computing
security maturity modelling addressed this gap in the literature [62]. Since cloud security computing
was considered as reasonable to be a separate maturity model, it was not incorporated as a focus area
in CYSFAM. For remarks #2 and #3, there were obvious limitations (lack of knowledge, resources) to
not include them in this version of CYSFAM. They do, however, form important challenges for future
research engagements. Remark #4 is inherent to the design and scope of this study; cybersecurity
is a domain that is largely embraced by technical specialists, rather than management and directors.
The improvements proposed along with remark #5 were incorporated in CYSFAM. The authors went
through six improvement proposals of the experts–three by each expert– and a common one proposed
by both experts. All seven improvements were reflected in the capabilities.
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6.2. Case Study and Results
The following requirements concerning the case study company were identified (inspired by [63]):
• The case study company is sufficiently large; there is a grounded possibility that the concepts
found in the literature are part of the case study company’s routine.
• The case study company is active in a “security-sensitive” domain; the case study company
manages and/or governs systems usually containing data that are of value.
• The case study company can provide the resources (time, money) and the conditions (culture)
which are required to carry out the research.
The case study was conducted at a Western European bank, which almost perfectly met the
conditions described above.
CYSFAM is considered to be successful if the following points can be verified (partly inspired
by [15]:
• CYSFAM assessment can be performed within a 4 h timeframe provided that the conditions are
suitable (timely communication with experts where needed is guaranteed).
• The questions make sense—at least to information and cybersecurity domain experts. This is the
most significant target audience for CYSFAM, notwithstanding that other information technology
professionals could consider CYSFAM beneficial.
• The case study organization recognizes itself in the assessment results.
Considering the verification points described above, it can be concluded that the assessment of
CYSFAM during the case study was proven to be successful. The organisation’s experts were able to
answer all the questions within four hours. The end-result of the assessment reflects the cybersecurity
maturity stage that the organization is currently in, i.e., effort has been put into improving cybersecurity;
however, there is a lot of work to be done, whereas the optimal stage of maturity is not in sight yet. The
assessment results are depicted in Figure 5. As can be seen from this figure, the cells shaded present
the capabilities achieved by the organisation.
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7. Discussion
In this research, the authors identified the cybersecurity focus areas and capabilities by using
standards, frameworks, and other resources resulting from the literature search. These focus areas and
capabilities were then structured to develop a maturity model conforming to the design principles of
focus area maturity models.
The different security domains and their relationships according to the ISO/IEC 27032—cybersecurity
guidelines—[17] were discussed in the Section 2. CYSFAM incorporates cybersecurity, application security,
and network security but not information security domains. The information security domain incorporates
a number of cybersecurity capabilities (see Figure 1); however, information security capabilities offer
insufficient depth and perspective for exploring cybersecurity capabilities. Therefore, in this research,
cybersecurity standards, frameworks and models were investigated thoroughly.
To evaluate CYSFAM, both expert interviews and a case study were conducted. The expert
evaluations led to several improvements that were discussed in Section 6. As a result of the case study,
a number of the cybersecurity deficiencies which came to light after the assessment were reflected
in the organization’s internal cybersecurity roadmaps. The impression expressed in the case study
was that the questions in the model were understandable and actionable. Due to the way that they
were phrased, the questions could seem a bit complex to digest when reading superficially; however,
in general, they were found to be comprehensible.
For a healthy and truly resistant setup of security, it is considered important that these security
domains are harmonized in one model. To provide a complete security scope, a federated toolkit that
combines the focus areas of ISFAM and CYSFAM is proposed in the next subsection. In the Federative
Information Security Toolkit (FIST) (Figure 6), the authors opt to depict how cybersecurity capabilities
would complement information security capabilities. We believe that this is the first structured attempt
to construct a harmonized, federative information security toolkit. In doing so, the existing models’
focus areas were reshuffled to fit in the framework shown in Figure 1.
CYSFAM might benefit from a more accurate and scientifically grounded focus area scoring
method. However, the scoring method presented was proven to be efficient in practice, as with the
proposed method in the ISFAM [15]. Nonetheless, there are signals that both methods are not optimal.
In addition, certain focus areas may have been overlooked in the process. Existing literature was used
in composing the CYSFAM. A logical consequence is that only focus areas that were opportune in the
(recent) history were included. There is absolutely no way to guarantee to what extent this model
is future-proof. This maintainability issue can be handled by a maintainability-by-design approach
possibly by implementing a rule-based system. This also stands for the FIST.
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have more challenges in adopting security practices
due to limited resources [64]. The issue of adapting existing maturity models to SME characteristics
was addressed by several studies [29,65,66]. With the benefit of guidelines and personalised advice,
SMEs would be able to improve their security profile; therefore, our current research focuses on
developing a unified and personalised information security FAM specifically for SMEs.
Federated Information Security Toolkit
This section describes the proposed Federated Information Security Toolkit (FIST) as an intertwined
FAM, by combining the ISFAM [15] and the CYSFAM. It is to be noted that this model is as-of-yet
a conceptual representation of what a federative information security toolkit could look like when
aggregating the ISFAM and the CYSFAM into one visual representation. It is not yet a well-rounded
model on its own; for that, more research is required with regards to the interdependencies of
this models’ focus areas and capabilities. Since the incident management capabilities identified for
cybersecurity overlap with those for information security, this focus area is only presented in the
information security part.
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8. Conclusions
The research presented in this paper contributes to the domain of cybersecurity frameworks,
particularly, cybersecurity self-assessment frameworks and maturity models. By surveying extensive
literature, the domain-expert evaluations, and a case study in a large organization, a scientifically
grounded cybersecurity focus area maturity model (CYSFAM) was developed which complements
the information security focus area maturity model (ISFAM) [15]. By presenting the way CYSFAM
complements ISFAM, we provide organisations with the broad view of an overarching security
approach. The expert evaluations resulted in improvements that were incorporated within the
cybersecurity capabilities. The case study showed the applicability of the model, and results helped
the formulation of a company’s cybersecurity improvement plan.
The CYSFAM encompasses 11 focus areas (sub-domains) in the cybersecurity domain. These focus
areas are grouped into two categories as Technical and Organizational to facilitate understanding and
manageability. As CYSFAM is a maturity model, it has assessment and measurement components in it.
The 144 assessment questions to assess the cybersecurity capabilities constitute a large part of the model
and they are included in a separate report which is openly accessible. The visual presentation and
accompanying description of the cybersecurity capabilities in the CYFAM can enable organisations to
formulate their capability implementation plan. As CYSFAM was evaluated by cybersecurity experts
and demonstrated in a case study company, it provides a solid foundation for organisations to start
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their cybersecurity endeavours with. CYSFAM is characterized by being a focus area maturity model
based mainly on standards. As the assessment questions are mostly derived from standards and
frameworks, CYSFAM can inherently facilitate awareness of and adherence to standards. In addition,
due to its high granularity, CYSFAM can provide tangible process improvement advice.
To get the most benefit from the CYSFAM as an improvement instrument, including implementation
guidelines per capability and personalized advice would be considered as a significant future research
area. As we further elaborated in Section 7, maintainability of the model and adaptability of the
model by SMEs are the most predominant areas for future research. Our ongoing research focuses on
designing an adaptable cybersecurity maturity model considering the characteristics SMEs and their
roles in the digital ecosystem.
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